[PDF][PDF] Game theoretic analysis for two-sided matching with resource allocation
We introduce a simple, but fundamental problem called Student-Project-Resource matching-
allocation problem (SPR). 1 On one hand, SPR can be considered as a two-sided, many-to …
allocation problem (SPR). 1 On one hand, SPR can be considered as a two-sided, many-to …
Strategyproof and fair matching mechanism for ratio constraints
We introduce a new type of distributional constraints called ratio constraints, which explicitly
specify the required balance among schools in two-sided matching. Since ratio constraints …
specify the required balance among schools in two-sided matching. Since ratio constraints …
[HTML][HTML] Multi-rank smart reserves: A general framework for selection and matching diversity goals
We study a problem where each school has flexible multi-ranked diversity goals, and each
student may belong to multiple overlap** types, and consumes only one of the positions …
student may belong to multiple overlap** types, and consumes only one of the positions …
Strategyproof and fair matching mechanism for union of symmetric m-convex constraints
We identify a new class of distributional constraints defined as a union of symmetric M-
convex sets, which can represent a wide range of real-life constraints in two-sided matching …
convex sets, which can represent a wide range of real-life constraints in two-sided matching …
On Achieving Leximin Fairness and Stability in Many-to-One Matchings
The past few years have seen a surge of work on fairness in allocation problems where
items must be fairly divided among agents having individual preferences. In comparison …
items must be fairly divided among agents having individual preferences. In comparison …
[PDF][PDF] Strategyproof Matching Mechanism under General Constraints
八尋健太郎 - 2024 - catalog.lib.kyushu-u.ac.jp
The many-to-one matching problem is a fundamental issue involving the allocation of two
sets of agents based on their preferences. Each agent belongs to one set (which we call …
sets of agents based on their preferences. Each agent belongs to one set (which we call …
On the Coexistence of Stability and Incentive Compatibility in Fractional Matchings
Stable matchings have been studied extensively in social choice literature. The focus has
been mostly on integral matchings, in which the nodes on the two sides are wholly matched …
been mostly on integral matchings, in which the nodes on the two sides are wholly matched …