Do parents value school effectiveness?
A Abdulkadiroğlu, PA Pathak, J Schellenberg… - American Economic …, 2020 - aeaweb.org
School choice may lead to improvements in school productivity if parents' choices reward
effective schools and punish ineffective ones. This mechanism requires parents to choose …
effective schools and punish ineffective ones. This mechanism requires parents to choose …
The welfare effects of coordinated assignment: Evidence from the New York City high school match
Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We
show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated …
show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated …
Applications of matching models under preferences
P Biró - 2017 - books.google.com
Matching problems under preferences have been studied widely in mathematics, computer
science and economics, starting with the seminal paper by Gale and Shapley (1962). A …
science and economics, starting with the seminal paper by Gale and Shapley (1962). A …
Heterogeneous beliefs and school choice mechanisms
This paper studies how welfare outcomes in centralized school choice depend on the
assignment mechanism when participants are not fully informed. Using a survey of school …
assignment mechanism when participants are not fully informed. Using a survey of school …
[PDF][PDF] Strategic 'mistakes': Implications for market design research
Using a rich data set on Australian college admissions, we show that even in strategically
straightforward situations, a non-negligible fraction of applicants adopt strategies that are …
straightforward situations, a non-negligible fraction of applicants adopt strategies that are …
The design of teacher assignment: Theory and evidence
To assign teachers to schools, a modified version of the well-known deferred acceptance
mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice. We show that this …
mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice. We show that this …
" Strategic" Behavior in a Strategy-Proof Environment
A mechanism is said to be strategy-proof if no agent has an incentive to misrepresent her
true preferences. This property is considered highly desirable for mechanisms that are used …
true preferences. This property is considered highly desirable for mechanisms that are used …
Self-selection in school choice
L Chen, JS Pereyra - Games and Economic Behavior, 2019 - Elsevier
We study self-selection in centralized school choice, a strategy that takes place when
students submit preferences before knowing their priorities at schools. A student self-selects …
students submit preferences before knowing their priorities at schools. A student self-selects …
[HTML][HTML] A survey of preference estimation with unobserved choice set heterogeneity
We provide an introduction to the estimation of discrete choice models when choice sets are
heterogeneous and unobserved to the econometrician. We survey the two most popular …
heterogeneous and unobserved to the econometrician. We survey the two most popular …
Efficiency and stability in large matching markets
YK Che, O Tercieux - Journal of Political Economy, 2019 - journals.uchicago.edu
We study efficient and stable mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents
is large and individuals' preferences and priorities are drawn randomly. When agents' …
is large and individuals' preferences and priorities are drawn randomly. When agents' …