On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Page 1 MATHEMATICS OF
OPERATIONS RESEARCH Vol. 43, No. 1, February 2018, pp. 100–129 http://pubsonline.informs.org/journal/moor …

Consider a first‐price sealed‐bid auction with interdependent valuations and private budget
constraints. Focusing on the two‐bidder case, we identify new sufficient conditions for the …

We provide easily-verifiable sufficient conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game to
guarantee the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayes–Nash equilibrium. We allow players' …

This note provides a full characterization of the set of Nash equilibria in the two-person all-
pay auction with discrete strategy space and complete information where bidders are treated …

In this paper, we revisit the two-bidder asymmetric all-pay auction of Amann and Leininger
(1996) by allowing interdependent values and correlated signals. Both values and signals …

I model innovation contests as an all‐pay auction in which it is possible not to achieve
successful innovation despite costly R&D investments, and as a result, there is no winner. In …

Many conditions have been introduced to ensure equilibrium existence in games with
discontinuous payoff functions. This paper introduces a new condition, called regularity, that …

We study a model of entrepreneurs who compete in an auction-like setting for venture
capital (VC) funding in a setting where limited capital dictates that the VC can only finance …

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and
private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric …

We prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many kinds of asymmetric
auctions with n bidders and unitary demands, interdependent values and independent …