In typical theoretical models of voting, all voters submit their vote at once, without an option
to change or revise their decision. While this assumption fits some political voting settings, it …

We suggest a new model for strategic voting based on local dominance, where voters
consider a set of possible outcomes without assigning probabilities to them. We prove that …

Social choice theory deals with aggregating the preferences of multiple individuals
regarding several available alternatives, a situation colloquially known as voting. There are …

We study convergence properties of iterative voting procedures. Such procedures are
defined by a voting rule and a (restricted) iterative process, where at each step one agent …

Classical results in social choice theory on the susceptibility of voting rules to strategic
manipulation make the assumption that the manipulator has complete information regarding …

We investigate the effect a social network could have on voting outcomes. We consider a
group of self-interested agents where each agent has a strict preference order over a set of …

Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of
action or allocation of resources, are central to artificial intelligence. In such situations …

Computational social choice is a research area at the intersection of computer science,
mathematics, and economics that is concerned with aggregation of preferences of multiple …

Following recent studies of iterative voting and its effects on plurality vote outcomes, we
provide characterisations and complexity results for three models of iterative voting under …

Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA)
as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profiles …