The (computational) social choice take on indivisible participatory budgeting

S Rey, J Maly - arxiv preprint arxiv:2303.00621, 2023 - arxiv.org
In this survey, we review the literature investigating participatory budgeting as a social
choice problem. Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a democratic process in which citizens are …

Robust and verifiable proportionality axioms for multiwinner voting

M Brill, J Peters - arxiv preprint arxiv:2302.01989, 2023 - arxiv.org
When selecting a subset of candidates (a so-called committee) based on the preferences of
voters, proportional representation is often a major desideratum. When going beyond …

Phragmén's voting methods and justified representation

M Brill, R Freeman, S Janson, M Lackner - Mathematical programming, 2024 - Springer
In the late 19th century, Swedish mathematician Edvard Phragmén proposed a load-
balancing approach for selecting committees based on approval ballots. We consider three …

Guide to numerical experiments on elections in computational social choice

N Boehmer, P Faliszewski, Ł Janeczko… - arxiv preprint arxiv …, 2024 - arxiv.org
We analyze how numerical experiments regarding elections were conducted within the
computational social choice literature (focusing on papers published in the IJCAI, AAAI, and …

How to sample approval elections?

S Szufa, P Faliszewski, Ł Janeczko, M Lackner… - arxiv preprint arxiv …, 2022 - arxiv.org
We study the multifaceted question of how to sample approval elections in a meaningful
way. Our analysis aims to discern the properties of various statistical cultures (both …

Proportional public decisions

P Skowron, A Górecki - Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on …, 2022 - ojs.aaai.org
We consider a setting where a group of individuals needs to make a number of independent
decisions. The decisions should proportionally represent the views of the voters. We …

Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Voting

E Elkind, S Obraztsova, J Peters, N Teh - arxiv preprint arxiv:2502.05949, 2025 - arxiv.org
We study a model of temporal voting where there is a fixed time horizon, and at each round
the voters report their preferences over the available candidates and a single candidate is …

Approval-based voting with mixed goods

X Lu, J Peters, H Aziz, X Bei, W Suksompong - Social Choice and Welfare, 2024 - Springer
We consider a voting scenario in which the resource to be voted upon may consist of both
indivisible and divisible goods. This setting generalizes both the well-studied model of …

Completing priceable committees: Utilitarian and representation guarantees for proportional multiwinner voting

M Brill, J Peters - Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial …, 2024 - ojs.aaai.org
When selecting committees based on preferences of voters, a variety of different criteria can
be considered. Two natural objectives are maximizing the utilitarian welfare (the sum of …

Market-based explanations of collective decisions

D Peters, G Pierczyński, N Shah… - Proceedings of the AAAI …, 2021 - ojs.aaai.org
We consider approval-based committee elections, in which a size-k subset of available
candidates must be selected given approval sets for each voter, indicating the candidates …